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The purpose of this article is to offer a sociohistorical overview of academic 
reform in the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). To do so, the 
author draws heavily from football history and its association with academic 
reform in the broader intercollegiate athletics context. Intercollegiate athletics 
has undergone significant changes in professionalism and academic integrity 
over time—something that suggests the current dysfunctional structure can be 
systemically changed, too.
I have been charged with laying out the broad context for the general topic of the 
colloquium, and for the keynote addresses and responses that follow. As a cultural 
historian, my focus has been on football, and I will focus my remarks on what 
I know best. I am fully aware of the irritation among advocates for nonrevenue 
and women’s sports when speakers focus only on football and men’s basketball. 
But football drove the development of college sports in this country, and along 
with men’s basketball, it has driven the academic reform agenda since the 1980s. 
Moreover, the two so-called revenue sports—at the most elite level—created the 
full-time, year-round model for all sports in not just Division I but also Division II. 
From my view, despite the higher graduation rates, particularly in women’s sports, 
this model has not worked to the benefit of these athletes, whose losses are merely 
the collateral damage from policies dictated by football and men’s basketball. All 
of this suggests thinking about academic reform means thinking primarily about 
football and men’s basketball, but that does not exclude thinking about how a single 
set of standards or requirements serves or does not serve the interests and needs 
of all athletes in all sports.
Part One
I’ll begin, then, by setting up the historical context.1 The era of academic reform 
did not truly begin until the 1980s, but the criticism of priorities and practices in 
intercollegiate sports, and thus an implicit call for reform, is nearly as old as col-
lege sports themselves. As Ron Smith has pointed out, controversy began with the 
second intercollegiate competition, a boat race between Harvard and Yale three 
years after their initial race in 1852, over Harvard’s use of a coxswain from the 
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1852 boat who had subsequently graduated. Yale protested but Harvard refused to 
remove him from the boat and proceeded to win (Smith, 2011).
Questions of eligibility were bitterly argued over for the next half-century, 
because college sports had no traditions, no governing body, and minimal insti-
tutional control. Our more recent wrangling over “initial eligibility” has been 
entirely an academic issue, but this was not so in this earlier period, when disputes 
more fundamentally concerned whether the athlete was an actual student at the 
college for which he was competing. That coxswain in 1855 was a Harvard man, 
but a graduate rather than a current student. Clearly that could not be allowed, but 
whether current students in the graduate and professional schools—law, medicine, 
and theology—should be allowed to play continued to be an issue well into the 
twentieth century.
Graduate students, at least, were actual students. The eligibility of what might 
euphemistically be called “part-time” or “irregular” students became an issue due 
to the win-at-all-costs ethic that Americans even at the most elite institutions of 
higher education brought to athletic competition. What became more bluntly known 
as “tramp athletes,” who enrolled for fall term only and never visited a classroom, 
or who moved from school to school for a better deal, were part of the college 
football world in the 1880s and 1890s, as were bitter feuds between schools over 
their eligibility.
The grounds for objecting to tramp athletes seem obvious. But eligibility was 
also tied to a British definition of “amateurism” that was class-based and incompat-
ible with American democratic principles. Not just tramp athletes, but also regular 
students who earned expense money by playing summer baseball were deemed to 
violate the amateur code. The NCAA still adamantly insists on amateurism, but 
what constitutes “amateurism” today would have appalled its champions at the turn 
of the twentieth century. Playing summer baseball for expense money could get 
you banned from college football. In January 2012, Oklahoma State won the Rose 
Bowl behind a twenty-eight-year-old quarterback who played five years of minor 
league baseball before enrolling in college. In the early years of college sports, 
any payment of tuition or fees or living expenses was a mark of “professionalism.” 
Today, tuition, room, and board constitute an athletic scholarship, which is funda-
mental to collegiate amateurism. Today, instead, we are wrestling with the living 
expenses part of the standard scholarship, in relation to a proposal to provide an 
extra $2,000, which is roughly half of what financial aid policies typically judge 
the Full Cost of Attendance. While high- and low-revenue programs wrestle with 
the economic impact, the official NCAA position is that compensation up to the full 
cost of attendance would still be within the bounds of amateurism, while anything 
beyond would be professionalism. However one feels about stipends for athletes, 
everyone should recognize that “amateurism” has been a shifting and flexible 
principle for a very long time.
To return to the historical context for academic reform: over the 1880s, 1890s, 
and early 1900s, as college athletics became increasingly organized, and shifted 
from student-run to institutional control, a four-point consensus on eligibility 
emerged that touched on academic principles: (a) competition should be limited 
to four years, (b) for only full-time undergraduate students, (c) in good academic 
standing, and (d) pursuing a degree.2 The basic principles remain the same today, 
though it now takes pages and pages of regulations to define each term. In these 
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early years, in the absence of any governing body, institutions were to monitor the 
eligibility of their own athletes. Notice that whether freshmen should be eligible 
for the varsity team was not part of the consensus. Where freshmen were allowed 
to compete, it was typically at small schools concerned about having enough 
skilled players for the team. Where freshmen were ineligible, it was more often 
out of concern about tramp athletes than the academic well-being of freshmen. The 
desire was simply to limit participation to bona fide students of the institution, as 
defined by that institution.
As football passed baseball and crew to become the chief college sport, no 
season passed without its controversies over eligibility or professionalism, but only 
the brutality of the game could arouse broad public outrage. Here is the earliest 
case of the power of the media in driving or hindering reform in college sports. The 
modern newspaper, as created by Joseph Pulitzer in New York in the 1880s, along 
with William Randolph Hearst when he entered the New York market to challenge 
Pulitzer in 1895, exploited the violence of football in the same way it exploited 
sensational crimes to drive up circulations, and in so doing it created, or at least 
magnified, the sense of crisis in college football. In what has become the NCAA’s 
familiar creation story, college football reached a crisis in the 1905 season, requir-
ing the intervention of President Roosevelt himself, out of which came the first 
nation-wide organization to oversee the conduct of the game, which eventually took 
the name National Collegiate Athletic Association. Roosevelt was more concerned 
about the demoralizing consequences of professionalism in college athletics, but 
he recognized it was brutality putting the game at risk with the public, and his 
taming of the “football slugger” added to his stature as the president with the Big 
Stick. Parenthetically, the issue of brutality has again become a matter of urgent 
concern in just the past few years, as evidence of the long-term consequences of 
head trauma accumulates.
Out of the 1905 crisis came a revision of the rules to make football safer, most 
significantly legalization of the forward pass. The first convention, in 1906, also 
adopted a policy on academic eligibility: “No student shall represent a College 
or University in any intercollegiate contest, who is not taking a full schedule of 
work as prescribed in the catalogue of the institution” (“Proceedings,” 1906; Falla, 
1981, p. 25). To my knowledge, this is the first official statement of an academic 
standard for college sports.
Part Two
Out of the 1905 crisis, of course, also came the NCAA itself, to recommend policy 
but without regulatory powers to enforce it until the 1940s. Beginning in 1895, with 
the forerunner of the Big Ten, conferences assumed whatever regulatory powers 
were attempted before the 1950s. In the 1920s, college football fully emerged as the 
country’s greatest sporting spectacle (as opposed to baseball, the national pastime), 
with massive concrete and steel stadiums sprouting up throughout the country. A 
10-point code adopted by the NCAA convention in December 1922 reveals what 
issues concerned member institutions at this time. Half of the principles addressed 
matters related to eligibility: freshmen not eligible for varsity competition; gradu-
ate students not eligible; eligibility limited to three years (not four); restrictions 
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on transfers from other colleges (to be adopted through conferences); and athletes 
banned from playing on any team other than those representing their own insti-
tutions. These are the basic principles adopted in 1906, slightly revised. Three 
additional principles addressed issues of control and oversight: schools encouraged 
to organize into sectional conferences, which would establish rules and enforce 
them; faculty should have absolute control of athletics on campus; and district 
representatives of the NCAA should visit colleges in the region to advocate for the 
principles of the Association. And two final principles addressed ethical issues: the 
principles of amateurism, as defined by the Association, should be adhered to; and 
gambling should be suppressed (Falla, 1981, pp. 128–29, 137). Underlying all of 
these was a basic principle of home rule: the members of the NCAA were to agree 
on recommendations, but institutions were to govern their own athletic programs 
as they saw fit, unless they ceded authority to a conference.
The absence of explicitly academic matters is striking, presumably meaning 
that none seemed urgent at the time. Amateurism, whether expressed explicitly 
in the aforementioned ethical provisions or implicitly in the rules on eligibility, 
remained the key issue, or rather the “professionalism” that violated the amateur 
code. “Professionalism’s” twin curse was “commercialism,” which exploded in 
the 1920s along with all of those stadiums arising. These two primary concerns 
culminated in the well-known 1929 report by the Carnegie Foundation, the first 
real landmark in efforts to reform college athletics. The primary focus of the report, 
and all of the media attention it received at the time, dealt with the recruiting and 
subsidizing of college football players for the sake of a commercial enterprise now 
staged in enormous stadiums that dwarfed any academic building on campus. But 
Chapter VI, titled “Athletic Participation and Its Results,” included information 
about the academic standing of athletes relative to nonathletes that provides an 
interesting touchstone for the issues facing us today. In a section on “Scholastic 
Requirements and Their Administration” the report was mildly positive, noting that 
academic standards had risen over the past twenty years, though how rigorously they 
were applied was more difficult to assess. The principle author, Howard Savage, 
cited several incidents of what he termed “conflicts between athletic ambitions 
and academic standards”: a president, trustee, or alumnus pressuring the registrar 
or overriding the faculty to admit an academically unqualified athlete; an athlete 
staying eligible “through the passing of an examination under circumstances that 
were, to say the least, unusual”; and a general questioning of academic standards 
at “certain Catholic institutions” (read Notre Dame here).
Except for the quaintness of the language, the Knight Commission or the Drake 
Group could have issued the concluding statement last week:
Faculties, trustees, and even college or university presidents are not as yet 
united as respects the maintenance of strict requirements in the face of the 
supposed benefits that can be wrung from winning teams. The fact that all of 
these supposed advantages are tinged at one point or another with the color of 
money casts over every relaxation of standards a mercenary shadow (Savage 
et al., 1929, p. 119).
But Savage et al. also reported the results from examining the academic records 
of 2,787 athletes and 11,480 nonathletes at 52 colleges and universities. In general, 
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the differences between athletes and nonathletes were negligible and not statisti-
cally meaningful (Savage et al., 1929):
•	 Athletes	actually	had	higher	average	course	loads	and	graduation	rates,	but	
slightly lower grades and “very slightly” higher rates of academic probation;
•	 Athletes	took	a	semester	longer	to	graduate;
•	 Athletes	 took	more	“easy”	courses	 than	nonathletes,	but	 also	more	“hard”	
ones;
•	 Regarding	athletes’	marginally	lower	grades,	football	players	were	at	the	bottom	
(interesting, along with polo players!), but 95% of athletes overall progressed 
to the following semester (compared with 90% of nonathletes);
•	 And	on	intelligence	tests,	nonathletes	scored	only	slightly	higher;	on	one	of	
the major ones, the Pennsylvania Achievement Test, athletes scored marginally 
higher than nonathletes (636.37–615.55), though football players (at 609.42) 
fell slightly below the nonathletes.
Big-time college athletics were controversial in 1929, but not for academic 
failures. And public response to the report’s charges about the recruiting and sub-
sidizing of athletes is instructive for thinking about the climate in which reform 
efforts continue to take place today. The Carnegie Foundation’s indictment of the 
schools that subsidized athletes received front-page attention wherever big-time 
football was played, but it appeared on a Thursday (October 24), followed by the 
local university’s denial or a shrug of indifference, after which the newspapers 
refocused their attention on what really mattered—how the home team would fare 
in Saturday’s game. The timing may have been bad—the report was published the 
very week that Wall Street crashed—but the dismissal by the press and the indif-
ference of the football public would have guaranteed a lack of impact in any case.
By the time of the Carnegie Foundation report, big-time college football had 
simply become too important (too big to fail, one might say)—to local communi-
ties and to the institutions depending on them—to be governed only by ethical 
and academic concerns. This was the era of intersectional football, when college 
football became a national sport with regional variants, whose champions com-
peted against each other for local and regional pride. This was also the era when 
what John Thelin (1994) (following Daniel Boorstin) calls the Booster College, or 
what Douglas Toma (2003) terms Football U., came into being: universities built 
themselves on the renown of their football teams.
And this was the era when coverage of sports exploded in a new era of mass 
media. The daily newspaper with its separate sports section and massive Sunday 
issue emerged in the 1920s. Newspapers had contributed hugely to the sense of 
crisis over the brutality of football in the 1890s and early 1900s. Not in 1929. 
Newspapers now depended on sports news for circulations, and sportswriters had 
cozy relationships with the coaches of the teams they covered. Commercial radio 
began in 1921 and by the end of the 1920s was carrying football games throughout 
the day on Fall Saturdays on both local stations and national networks. College 
football feature films proliferated after 1925, and about 20% of the newsreel before 
the feature was devoted to sports, which meant college football in the Fall. By the 
end of the twenties, the media and college football were mutually dependent in 
ways now taken for granted, and sustained criticism of college sports, as opposed 
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to the occasional rant, became all but unthinkable in the popular media. The general 
indifference of the football public to reform, fed by the most powerful media, is a 
crucial factor to consider when contemplating the prospects for reform, particularly 
academic reform, in college athletics today.
While football in the 1920s was already becoming the tail that wagged the col-
lege dog, it is important to recognize that the sport also played a genuinely progres-
sive social role in this era. Here, the lesson from history is to prompt consideration 
whether it continues to play a comparable role today. College football, like higher 
education generally, was elitist from its beginnings in an era, when just 1–2% of 
Americans went to college. As late as 1940, the figure was still only 16%. Football 
played a key role in democratizing American higher education, both actually and 
symbolically, as a predominantly WASP (White, Anglo Saxon Protestant) game 
celebrated in the late nineteenth century for embodying the spirit of Anglo Saxon 
racial superiority began to be dominated by the sons of working-class Irish, Italian, 
Polish, Slavic, and Jewish immigrants—at a time when anti-immigrant hysteria, 
fed by anti-Catholicism, was gripping the country. Notre Dame had a key role here, 
as football’s first “America’s Team,” but representing the America of ethnic and 
religious outsiders. Working-class ethnic football players became an extremely 
conspicuous minority on football rosters over the 1920s and 1930s. In a study of 
the social profile of professional football players, for example—former collegians 
who had been top players at their schools—the historian Steven Riess calculated that 
20% of NFL players from 1935 to 1945 were either Slavic or Italian (Riess, 1991).
Given the class and ethnic transformation of college football, at a time when 
the intellectual abilities and academic performance of athletes, as documented by 
the Carnegie Foundation, seem to have been not markedly different from those of 
nonathletes, it is instructive that there developed in the popular culture a stereotype 
of the dumb jock that seems to suggest a general assumption that lots of football 
players were dummies, irrespective of the evidence. The alternative stereotype of 
the football star as campus god and handsome hero was more pervasive, but the 
dumb jock became a familiar figure in print and film in the 1930s. Andy Devine 
(remembered by my generation as Jingles, Wild Bill Hickok’s comic sidekick in a 
1950s TV western series) and Jack Oakie played this character in several films. The 
Oakie character in the 1941 film from the Thurber story “University Days,” is named 
Boley Bolenciecwcz, not, say, Tommy Wilson, during an era when All-Americans, 
particularly in the East and Midwest, often had names like Bronko Nagurski, Frank 
Carideo, Alex Wojciechowicz, Sid Luckman, and Marshall Goldberg. Other fictional 
dumb jocks included Ivory Ivorson, Ox Lenihan, Adolph Kroger, and Pete Maciek. 
The figure of the dumb jock goes back to ancient Greece, but the American version 
in this period had a distinctly local ethnic flavor.
Part Three
Big-time college football entered a new era in the 1950s with the institution, at 
last, of the athletic scholarship in 1956. Throughout the 1930s “professionalism” 
remained the major source of controversy, as southern conferences became the first 
to approve athletic scholarships, while the Big Ten and Pacific Coast Conference 
continued to reject them but subsidized their athletes by providing jobs on campus 
or through alumni. The Big Ten and PCC condemned the southern schools for 
10  Oriard
professionalism. The southern schools accused the northern and western schools of 
hypocrisy, for providing scam jobs (perhaps, cleaning snow off the sidewalks at the 
University of Southern California) rather than forthright scholarships. The NCAA, 
for the first time, took on enforcement powers at the December 1940 convention 
but did nothing with them until January 1948, when it approved “The Principles for 
the Conduct of Intercollegiate Athletics,” otherwise known as the “Sanity Code.”
Five of the “Principles” more or less reiterated the basics from the 1906 and 
1922 conventions: (a) athletes held to the same academic standards governing other 
students; (b) one-year residency for transfers; (c) limit of three years of varsity 
competition; (d) restriction to undergraduates only; and freshmen ineligibility (Falla, 
1981). But the key provision was the ban on financial aid for athletic ability, which 
directly clashed with the current practices at many universities, particularly in the 
South. Two years later, when the membership refused to expel the University of 
Virginia and six other institutions for violations, the Sanity Code was dead. In its 
place, at the January 1952 convention, the NCAA approved a 12-point code that 
significantly expanded on the 10-point code of 1922.
Half of the principles addressed various aspects of “professionalism” (Falla, 
1981), in language as vague as my paraphrasing here:
 4. Reconsider the free-substitution rule in football;
 7. Limit the number and amount of financial grants to athletes, to come from the 
institution, not from alumni or boosters;
 8. “[E]nlist the support of true lovers of wholesome college athletics, particularly 
in alumni areas, to reduce undesirable recruiting”;
 9. Strictly adhere to the letter and spirit of the rules, once they have been 
established by regional or national groups;
 10. Ban all subsidies or gifts beyond what is regularly permitted by the institution 
or conference;
 11. Eliminate excessive entertainment of prospective athletes.
But the other half either directly or indirectly addressed the academic welfare 
of college athletes, in contrast to that lack of concern in 1922:
 1. Confine practice sessions to the recognized season of the sport (that is, no 
spring football), and limit or closely supervise out-of-season practices;
 2. Limit the number of games in each sport, particularly football and basketball;
 3. Reconsider postseason games in the light of pressures they create (i.e., a 
potential ban on bowl games);
 5. Require normal academic progress toward a degree for purposes of eligibility;
 6. Admit athletes only under the institution’s published requirements;
 12. Give close attention to the curriculum of the athlete, to assure that he is not 
diverted from his educational objective.
From our perspective today, the first three principles—attempts to limit the 
time commitment required for the sport—have been utterly ignored, as restrictions 
on seasons, postseasons, and off-seasons have been obliterated. Principles 5, 6, and 
12, on the other hand, are all too familiar: they are the issues (initial eligibility, 
academic progress, and ultimate graduation) that we continue to wrestle with today.
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The 1950s was an era of unprecedented scandal in college sports: the point-
shaving scandals in basketball and, in football, the cheating scandal at West Point 
in 1951, followed by the slush-fund scandals in the old Pacific Coast Conference 
that led to the dissolution of the conference by the end of the decade. The overrid-
ing problem with college football in the late 1940s and 1950s was termed “over-
emphasis,” and this was the moment when the modern era of big-time college sports 
came into being, as universities had to choose whether to drop football (as several 
Catholic universities did), de-emphasize it (as the Ivy League most conspicuously 
did, banning bowl games and spring practice), or go along with the over-emphasized 
version. In finally solving the decades-long battle over “professionalism” by adopt-
ing athletic scholarships in 1956, the NCAA accepted “over-emphasis” as the norm. 
In addition, after decades of being organized simply by region, the NCAA in 1956 
created “university” and “college” divisions, beginning the long process by which 
the major athletic powers would increasingly separate themselves from the rest. 
The 1950s thus marked a crucial turning point for American college sports.
Principles 5 and 6 of the 12-point code of 1952—normal academic progress 
and admission of athletes by regular university standards—became more specific 
in 1959, when the NCAA officially defined normal progress as a minimum of 12 
credit hours per term; then in 1965, when it adopted the so-called 1.600 rule for 
financial aid, a measurement based on high school GPA ranking and test scores 
that projected a 1.6 college GPA, along with a requirement of a 1.6 GPA in col-
lege courses for continuing eligibility. The rule immediately became controversial 
because of concern about the validity of standardized tests and, soon, because of its 
potential conflict with university policies opening up admission to disadvantaged 
students. More pragmatically, it also restricted which athletes coaches could recruit. 
An attempt to abolish the rule at the 1971 convention failed, then another attempt, 
in 1973, succeeded, replacing the 1.600 rule with a simpler requirement of a 2.0 
high school GPA for initial eligibility, and restoring institutional authority over 
determining normal progress (Falla, 1981).
The abolition of the 1.600 rule was part of a package of changes made at the 
1972 and 1973 NCAA conventions that, I would argue (and I’m guessing that few 
would dispute), fundamentally redefined student athletes as athlete students. The 
1972 convention made freshmen eligible for varsity competition in football and 
basketball, as they had been in other sports since 1968. Then at the 1973 convention, 
in addition to abolishing the 1.600 rule, members replaced the four-year scholarship 
with one-year renewable grants (following repeated unsuccessful attempts to do 
this since 1965), and at a special session later in the year, they divided the associa-
tion into Divisions I, II, and III—a refinement of the “university” and “college” 
divisions created in 1956, that was further refined by the separation of Division I 
into I-A and I-AA in 1978.
These changes opened up college athletics to anyone with a high-school 
diploma, made her or him eligible as a freshman, and made renewal of scholarships 
dependent on satisfying the coach—and they did this at the moment when full racial 
integration was finally being achieved, creating a huge pool of talented athletes 
with inadequate educational backgrounds in too many cases. All of this should have 
been evident at the time. What could not have anticipated were several factors that 
would soon make college sports the full-time, year-round occupation that we now 
know. No one likely foresaw in 1973 that weight-training and watching game films 
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would soon add hours to the athletes’ time commitment, at the expense of sleep 
and study. Weight-lifting was just beginning to become a part of athletic training; 
it was mostly informal and never in-season (the assumption being that muscles 
needed rest, not further strengthening). Reels of film could not be easily copied, 
edited, or even projected; watching film was limited to after-dinner meetings with 
the offense in one room, the defense in another. All of this would change, in an 
environment transformed by media and revenues no one also could have foreseen 
in 1973, when athletic programs, like their universities, were struggling in a weak 
economy plagued by a combination of recession and inflation.
The changes of 1972–1973 put the NCAA on a collision course with academic 
scandal, and created Ground Zero for the world of continuous academic reform 
in which we still operate. No systematic data collection on academic performance 
and graduation rates was conducted until the federal government began mandat-
ing it in the 1980s, but case studies by sports sociologists and a few universities 
suggest the general state of affairs in this period. Recall that the 1929 Carnegie 
report found athletes and nonathletes graduating at about the same rate, whatever 
that rate was. Calculations by historian Steven Riess (or cited by Riess) based on 
varying sample sizes (and varying reliability), came up with graduation rates for 
professional football players from the 1930s through the 1960s ranging from 54.2 
to 60 percent. In contrast, for a fairly large sample of NFL players in 1982—that 
is, not quite a decade into the world created by the NCAA in 1972–73—just 31.5% 
had college degrees (Riess, 1991).
Whatever the rates for earlier decades, a handful of case studies by sociologists 
in the 1970s and 1980s revealed declining rates, and some of them marked 1973 
as a turning point. At Michigan State, 80% of freshmen athletes entering in 1953 
graduated (compared with 45% of students overall); of those entering in 1973, 
61% of athletes graduated compared with 62% overall. At Colorado State, 27% of 
football players in the 1970s graduated. At Minnesota, nine percent of basketball 
players from 1978 to 1983 graduated. At New Mexico, from 1970 to 1979, 21% of 
football players and 28% of basketball players graduated. At Texas, between 1975 
and 1981, 18% of basketball players graduated. At Memphis State, from 1973 to 
1983, just six of 58 basketball players graduated, none of them Black. In the Big 
Eight conference, graduation rates for football players entering in Fall 1980 ranged 
from 41% for Missouri at the top to 16% for Oklahoma State at the bottom.
Among these studies, the most dramatic was conducted by Tulane University 
of its own student athletes from 1967 to 1984. In 1973, the mean SAT score for an 
incoming athlete in football or basketball was 1022, compared with 1114 for all 
undergraduates. By 1984, the average SAT for athletes in the revenue sports had 
dropped to 691, while scores for all students stayed roughly the same (up from 
1114 to 1121). Not surprisingly, the Tulane study also found that the mean GPA 
for athletes in the revenue sports from 1980 to 1984 was 1.93, compared with 2.73 
for a sample of all undergraduates (for an overview, see Eitzen, 1987).
Abysmally lower graduation rates were scandalous but not “scandals,” which 
are not the unsavory events themselves but the public awareness and reaction to 
them. The academic performance of college athletes first became “scandals” around 
1980, when the New York Times, U. S. News & World Report, Sports Illustrated, 
Newsweek, and other media leaders made them front-page or cover stories.3 “The 
Shame of College Sports,” as Newsweek termed it, included altered transcripts, 
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credit for courses not taken, students paid to take athletes’ exams, athletes funneled 
into worthless classes to keep them eligible only to leave the university without 
an education. To appear in one of these stories was among a university president’s 
worse nightmares, and it undermined the very reason for having a big-time athletic 
program in the first place—to enhance the university’s reputation. The 1980s saw a 
steady stream of such scandals, featuring poster figures of college sports’ failures 
such as Kevin Ross, Chris Washburn, and Dexter Manley, who tearfully testified 
before a Senate subcommittee in 1988 that, despite four years of college, he was 
essentially illiterate. There was also a series of ugly incidents when academic tutors 
of athletes such as Jan Kemp at Georgia, Linda Bensel-Meyers at Tennessee, Jan 
Gangelhoff at Minnesota, Norma McGill at Ohio State, and Caroline Owen at LSU 
blew the whistle on their schools’ cheating, only to find themselves vilified or fired. 
Academic scandals of these sorts have, of course, occurred periodically ever since.
Institutions can choose to ignore low graduation rates, but not scandals. As 
these inevitable scandals unfolded, the NCAA scrambled to undo the damage it had 
done at the 1972 and 1973 conventions. I assume that the details of the academic 
reform movement since the 1980s are more generally familiar than the earlier his-
tory I have covered, so I will move quickly over them. Proposition 48, approved 
at the 1983 NCAA convention and implemented in August 1986, required a score 
of 700 on the SAT, plus a 2.0 GPA in eleven core high school courses for initial 
eligibility. The use of standardized test scores provoked controversy and outrage, 
particularly from the presidents of historically Black colleges. With the long-overdue 
achievement of full integration by the 1970s, talented African American athletes 
with inadequate educational preparation were disproportionately affected by the 
relaxed admission standards, which meant that they were also disproportionately 
affected by attempts to strengthen standards. (Harry Edwards was a conspicuous 
defender of Prop 48, not in defense of standardized testing, but on the grounds 
that that raising academic expectations for Black high school athletes would be a 
good thing—the required 700 SAT, in fact, was too low—because they would rise 
to meet them.)
In 1989, the NCAA convention passed Proposition 42, denying financial aid 
to partial qualifiers (i.e., those with the requisite GPA or SAT but not both). Furi-
ously attacked, it was rescinded the next year. The so-called “Reform Convention” 
of 1991, when university presidents conspicuously assumed leadership, included 
a limit on athletic participation of 20 hours per week in season, 8 hours out of 
season. That year, the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics issued its 
first report, proposing specific reforms and more broadly calling on presidents to 
assert more control. In 1992, Proposition 16 modified Proposition 48 by creating 
a sliding scale of SAT scores and GPA’s, now in 13 core courses (by 2008 the 
number of core courses had risen to 16). In October 2011, the required 2.0 GPA in 
high school core courses was raised to 2.3, and the required GPA for transfers was 
raised from 2.0 to 2.5. The latest, and current, mechanism for academic reform, 
the Academic Progress Rate, or APR, was implemented in 2005, with the first 
penalties meted out in 2006.
Academic standards today, then, are governed by initial eligibility rules (a slid-
ing scale by which, for example, a 700 SAT requires a 2.8 GPA while a 2.3 GPA 
needs a 900 SAT); by the APR (mandating academic progress that leads to roughly 
a 50% Graduation Success Rate); and by a supposed limit on athletic participation 
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of 20 hours a week in season and 8 hours a week out of season. Serious concerns 
about these standards include: (a) “SAT gaps” between athletes and nonathletes, 
typically over 200 points and exceeding 300 points at some schools; the reality of 
full-time athletic commitments (as much as 44 hours per week for football players 
according to the NCAA’s own data), as opposed to the mandated limits; a minimum 
APR standard that is not very high, pegged to graduate only half of a team’s athletes; 
the lower scores for football and men’s basketball than for other sports; the lower 
scores for Black athletes than for White; the need for athletes to choose a major 
immediately rather than to explore, as other students can do; and the pressure to 
“cluster” athletes in less challenging majors—to have them “major” in eligibility.
To these issues I would add my own two broad concerns. First, the concurrent 
pursuit of victories and revenues creates enormous pressure to get the best athletes 
and keep them eligible, which continuously undermines efforts to make their edu-
cation a true priority. And second, a serious uncertainty exists as to whether the 
education possible for college athletes today, under the current system and within 
today’s broader sports culture and job market, benefits them in the long-term as 
college sports benefited those from my generation and earlier.
On that first point, I assume that the basic outline of the unrestrained pursuit of 
revenues since the 1970s is familiar: the creation of the College Football Associa-
tion in 1976 through its victory before the Supreme Court in 1984 over television 
rights, which led to conference realignments and ever-growing television deals 
beginning in the 1990s, along with the bowl arrangements culminating in the Bowl 
Championship Series in 1998. Over the course of these developments, the preexist-
ing gap between economic haves and have-nots widened and became more rigidly 
institutionalized. These revenues have been pursued within a larger sports culture 
utterly transformed by 24/7 sports media, the billions of dollars they generate, 
and the millions of dollars awaiting athletes good enough to make it in the NFL 
or NBA. There cannot be very many top high school athletes in this environment 
who arrive at college with education as their highest priority. And the stakes are 
so high for those who can make it to the next level that sport most likely remains 
the highest priority until professional options disappear.
My second broad concern addresses the implicit contract between college 
athletes and their universities by which the athletes are to receive a meaningful 
education in return for their athletic services. That is, I wonder about the long-term 
benefits of the education offered college athletes today, particularly for football and 
basketball players, most particularly for African American football and basketball 
players, whose situation is similar to that of the lower-class ethnic players of the 
1920s and 1930s. In the absence of comprehensive or systematic data on this matter, 
there are bits of data that confirm what is generally assumed from considerable 
anecdotal evidence: college football from the 1920s through the 1960s and beyond 
did in fact help working-class, often ethnic outsiders enter the great American 
middle class. Consider the following. Riess (1991) found that 95.8% of former 
NFL players from the 1930s, and 99.1% from the 1950s, ended up in white-collar 
jobs. Loy (1969) surveyed 845 athletes at UCLA, including 192 football players, 
who had won at least three varsity letters, and found that they entered postcollege 
careers with significantly higher occupational status than did their fathers. Finally, 
Sack (1987), in his analysis of Notre Dame football players from 1946 through 
1965, found athletes did as well as nonathletes in their postcollege careers (and 
first-teamers did better), despite coming from lower socioeconomic backgrounds.
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The many examples of successful businessmen and CEO’s who played college 
athletics reinforces the long-held idea that competitive sports are ideal training for 
success in later careers. In fact, this was one of the bases for women’s demanding 
equal opportunities in school sports, to offset their disadvantages in later profes-
sional careers. To my mind, an enormously important question today—possibly the 
most important question—is whether college sports is still doing that for athletes, 
at public institutions as well as selective private ones, and for football and men’s 
basketball players as well as swimmers and gymnasts. I am hoping that the NCAA 
will soon provide some answers to that question, from the findings from its GOALS 
and SCORE studies.
Part Four
This brings me in conclusion to the question, how can the historical framework 
that I have laid out help us think about the prospects for academic reform? First, 
history teaches us that the current structure of intercollegiate athletics is the result 
not of inexorable market forces but of institutional choices, however driven by 
those market forces. The NCAA was created in 1905–06. It was reinvented in the 
1950s. It radically changed the experience of college athletes in the early 1970s. Its 
football elite radically changed the economic foundations in the 1980s and 1990s, 
and are changing it again today with astonishing new television contracts and the 
resulting conference realignments. The system of intercollegiate athletics that we 
have today, which seems impervious to systemic change, is in fact the product of 
past systemic changes and can be changed again.
This point is essential, because what has become since the 1980s a culture of 
scandal in college sports—scandal, followed by reform to prevent future scandal, 
in an endlessly repeatable cycle—presupposes the current structure and does 
nothing to address its systemic flaws. This point was made in a cover story of the 
Columbia Journalism Review this past fall, where the author describes the “Scandal 
Beat” of investigative reporters whose exposure of the latest corruption in college 
sports creates an illusion of meaningful reform while actually distracting attention 
from the need for systemic change (Libit, 2011). A similar argument can be made 
about the academic reforms that have essentially been driven since the 1980s, not 
by concern for education as the highest priority but by a desire to avoid scandal. 
Today, for example, raising academic standards through strengthening the APR and 
increasing its penalties begs all of the questions about whether the APR actually 
guarantees opportunities for a meaningful educational experience.
Obviously, it is important to ask what is possible for academic reform under 
the current structure, but little more can be expected beyond tweaking the APR, 
and even this tweaking is severely constrained:
•	 One	set	of	rules	governs	all	athletes	in	all	sports,	and	those	rules	are	driven	by	
football and men’s basketball;
•	 The	APR	governs	both	 the	 economic	haves	 and	 the	have-nots,	 fueling	 the	
facilities arms race for high-revenue programs, while the rest struggle with 
inadequate resources;
•	 In	 the	 current	 two-pronged	agenda	of	 the	NCAA—mandatory compliance 
with the APR and voluntary fiscal responsibility—it is impossible to reduce 
the pressures to get the best athletes and keep them eligible.
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But the APR is tied to the current structure, and while these things seem to 
unfold in slow motion, that structure has become vulnerable on many fronts:
•	 Conference	realignments	and	the	mad	scramble	for	a	spot	in	one	of	the	BCS	
conferences are probably not completed, and they are already resulting in 
a severely widened gap between haves and have-nots. (The latest report on 
revenues and expenses from the NCAA has two-year-old data—which don’t 
account, for example, for the new TV deals, but it captures the revenue dispari-
ties in the FBS that have been great for some time and will be dramatically 
exacerbated by the latest TV deals (Fulks, 2011).
•	 Growing	contempt	for	 the	BCS,	whether	for	 its	economic	impact	or,	more	
simply, for its failure to reward the most deserving teams, is notably shared 
by several Congressional legislators as well as fans;
•	 Ongoing	lawsuits	over	uncompensated	use	of	athletes’	images	for	commercial	
purposes (the O’Bannon case is scheduled to go to trial in 2013) appear to 
have very strong chance of succeeding;
•	 In	just	recent	weeks	(as	I	write),	a	cover	story	in	the	Atlantic Monthly (“The 
Shame of College Sports”) written by the eminent historian Taylor Branch 
and the Chronicle of Higher Education (“What the Hell’s Wrong with College 
Sports?”) were unusually harsh and received wide attention.
The NCAA has been paying attention, but last summer’s proposal to allow 
$2,000 stipends was rejected in the fall and is back on the table. It will not go away. 
In fact, the resolution of this dispute could easily become the first rupture in the 
NCAA’s present structure. Athletic programs that can afford the stipend cannot 
afford to let it drop, for fear that Congress or the courts will impose something 
more substantial. A split between institutions that offer or do not offer the stipend 
would widen the current separation between haves and have-nots into more dis-
tinct athletic universes. That could easily be just the beginning of truly systemic 
change, as institutions on either side of the divide would face different challenges 
and might feel forced to rethink their priorities. In this scenario, systemic change 
for financial reasons—the only kind that can drive such change—would open up 
opportunities for meaningful academic reform, too.
I do not want to get too deep into what-if speculation, but it is difficult to 
conceive the NCAA standing pat with a current structure plagued by such radical 
disparities in revenue. If Division I should separate into those that compensate ath-
letes beyond the level of current scholarships and those that do not, the challenges 
for the two groups would be quite different. For the athletic elite, why would the 
shift stop here? A $2,000 stipend is only halfway toward the full cost of attendance. 
But why stop even there? The full cost of attendance for those who generate the 
revenues is a pittance compared with the millions their coaches earn and the tens 
of millions that go to their institutions. What happens when the O’Bannon case 
over the licensing of athletes’ images by their institutions goes to trial? The pos-
sibilities go on and on. Athletes with professional aspirations currently are not 
allowed to have agents or to transfer schools to improve their prospects. If the 
goal, or the legal mandate, is to do what is right for elite college athletes, how can 
this be done without abandoning the pretense of amateurism altogether? But what 
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about the athletes in the sports that don’t generate much revenue? And what about 
Title IX? I hope that a lot of athletics administrators are thinking hard about these 
matters right now.
For institutions outside the athletic elite, the challenges, and opportunities, 
would be utterly different. I cannot imagine a university president or board of 
trustees in the current system choosing radical de-emphasis. But if external forces 
impose de-emphasis, options currently unthinkable become possible. True, schools 
could continue competing as they do now, with scholarships but no stipends, in the 
shadow of the super conferences, but would the benefits to the institution warrant 
the expenditures required to do so? If not, envisioning an alternative might be like 
choosing a reset point for “system restore” on your computer. Which point do you 
choose, before things got mucked up?
There is no lack of proposals for academic reform out there today, from the Knight 
Commission, the Drake Group, and others, which would essentially reset the system 
at the NCAA’s 1952 Principles: athletes treated as regular students and given a real 
opportunity to get a regular student’s education. Such proposals, under the NCAA’s 
current structure, usually seem quixotic. College sports have had no Golden Age, 
when students just showed up for tryouts and every athlete was on the dean’s list. 
And I know that the Ivies and Division III have their own issues with athletics. But 
the 1950s marked a turning point, when some institutions opted for a complementary 
balance between academics and athletics, while others kept moving in a direction 
that culminated in the actions of the 1972 and 1973 NCAA conventions, and then in 
due course in the scandal-driven academic reform movement that followed.
There appears to be a growing consensus that the current system of college 
sports fails too many “student athletes” both as students and, in the case of those 
with professional potential, as athletes. The media have not played a decisive role 
in athletic reform, except to blunt it, since 1905, when the issue was brutality, not 
academics. A critical consensus emerging in the media today is primarily concerned 
with the economic exploitation of the young men who generate the revenues in 
football and basketball. No such media-driven mandate is present—or even pos-
sible, history would tell us—regarding academic reform. Universities, as always, 
will be on their own here.
It is important to think hard about what academic reform is possible within the 
current system. But we might also think about what could become possible when 
the old system collapses. That seems to be coming, and sooner rather than later.
Notes
1. Throughout this essay I draw on my published books Reading Football, King Football, and 
Bowled Over, but I do not clutter this text with references to them.
2. On the early history of American college sports, see particularly Smith (2011) and Watterson 
(2000).
3. Philip Taubman, “Faking of College Credits for Athletes Is Under Inquiry,” New York Times, 
January 9, 1980; “Behind Scandals in Big-Time College Sports,” U.S. News & World Report, 
February 11, 1980; “The Shame of American Education,” Sports Illustrated, May 19, 1980; “The 
Shame of College Sports,” Newsweek, September 22, 1980.
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